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Abstract. We investigate the possibility of modelling the syntax and
semantics of natural language by constraints, or rules, imposed by the
multi-dimensional type theory Nabla. The only multiplicity we explicitly
consider is two, namely one dimension for the syntax and one dimension
for the semantics, but the general perspective is important. For example,
issues of pragmatics could be handled as additional dimensions.
One of the main problems addressed is the rather complicated repertoire
of operations that exists besides the notion of categories in traditional
Montague grammar. For the syntax we use a categorial grammar along
the lines of Lambek. For the semantics we use so-called lexical and logical
combinators inspired by work in natural logic. Nabla provides a concise
interpretation and a sequent calculus as the basis for implementations.
. . . Lambek originally presented his type logic as a calculus of syntactic types.
Semantic interpretation of categorial deductions along the lines of the Curry-Howard
correspondence was put on the categorial agenda in J. van Benthem (1983) The seman-
tics of variety in categorial grammar, Report 83-29*, Simon Fraser University, Canada.
This contribution made it clear how the categorial type logics realize Montagues Uni-
versal Grammar program — in fact, how they improve on Montagues own execution of
that program in offering an integrated account of the composition of linguistic meaning
and form. Montagues adoption of a categorial syntax does not go far beyond notation:
he was not interested in offering a principled theory of allowable ‘syntactic operations’
going with the category formalism.
* Revised version in [2]
M. Moortgat (1997) Categorial Type Logics, in J. van Benthem & A. ter Meulen (eds.)
Handbook of Logic and Language, Elsevier.
Full paper of short presentation at the International Workshop on Constraint Solving
and Language Processing (CSLP 2004). This research was partly sponsored by the IT
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21 Introduction
We investigate the possibility of modelling the syntax and semantics of natural
language by constraints, or rules, imposed by the multi-dimensional type theory
Nabla [28]. The only multiplicity we explicitly consider here is two, namely one
dimension for the syntax and one dimension for the semantics, but we find the
general perspective to be important. For example, issues of pragmatics could
be handled as additional dimensions by taking into account direct references to
language users and, possibly, other elements of the situation in which expressions
are used. We note that it is possible to combine many dimensions into a single
dimension using Cartesian products. Hence there is no theoretical difference
between a one-dimensional type theory and a multi-dimensional type theory.
However, we think that in practice the gain can be substantial.
Nabla is a linguistic system based on categorial grammars [2] and with so-
called lexical and logical combinators [29] inspired by work in natural logic [22].
The original goal was to provide a framework in which to do reasoning involving
propositional attitudes like knowledge and beliefs [30,32].
1.1 Background
In computational linguistics work on Nabla [30] has previously focussed entirely
on the logical semantics of propositional attitudes replacing the classical higher
order (intensional) logic [14] to an inconsistency-tolerant, or paraconsistent, (ex-
tensional) logic [33] by introducting some kind of partiality, or indeterminacy,
cf. [18]. These ideas have also found applications outside natural language se-
mantics as such, in particular in advanced databases and multi-agent systems
[31,32].
1.2 Arguments
In Nabla we can specify a grammar, that is, a definition of a set of well-formed
expressions. Given the grammar, we can also specify a logic in Nabla. The logic
defines the notion of a correct argument. We use the mark
√
for correct argu-
ments and the mark ÷ for incorrect arguments:
John is a man. Victoria is a woman. John loves Victoria. √
John loves a woman. A man loves Victoria.
John loves Victoria. ÷
John loves a woman. A man loves Victoria.
The sentences above the line are the premises of the argument; the sentences
below the line are the conclusions of the argument. By allowing multiple conclu-
sions we obtain a nice symmetry around the line.
3Note that the mark indicates what the logic says about the correctness — it
does not say what is possible or not possible to infer in any particular situation.
For instance, if one do not understand English or just do not understand the
single word ‘is’ (one might take it to be synonymous to ‘hates’) then it might be
more appropriate to take the first argument to be incorrect; or if one presuppose
knowledge about the conventions for male and female names then it might be
more appropriate to take the second argument to be correct.
To sum up: in Nabla we specify both a grammar and a logic; these defines the
set of all arguments (and hence the set of all sentences and other subexpressions)
and the set of correct arguments (and hence the set of incorrect arguments is
the remaining arguments).
1.3 Formulas
The logic for the formulas is here first order logic, also known as predicate logic
[27]. The meaning of the first argument is the following formula:
MJ ∧WV ∧ LJV ⇒ ∃y(Wy ∧ LJy) ∧ ∃x(Mx ∧ LxV )
We use a rather compact notation. We use lowercase letters for variables and
uppercase letters for constants (both for ordinary constants like J and V for
‘John’ and ‘Victoria’ and for predicate constants likeM for ‘man’,W for ‘woman’
and L for ‘love’). Note that conjunction ∧ has higher priority than implication⇒
and that the quantifier ∃ has even higher priority (hence we need the parentheses
to get the larger scope).
1.4 Strings
Traditionally, the map from arguments to formulas would consist of a map from
the individual sentences of the argument to formulas and a procedure describing
the assembling of the final formula from the separate formulas. The map from
the sentences would have to deal with various inflections and possibly minor
items like punctuation and rules of capitalization.
Consider again the argument:
John is a man. Victoria is a woman. John loves Victoria. √
John loves a woman. A man loves Victoria.
In Nabla we make a single pass over the argument to obtain a string, which is a
sequence of tokens (a token is to be thought of as a unit representing a word or
a phrase):
John be a man also Victoria be a woman also John love Victoria so
John love a woman also a man love Victoria
4Note the tokens so and also as well as the changes to the verbs (the person and
tense information is discarded since we only consider present tense, third person).
We emphasize that the map from arguments to string is a simple bijection.
Only quite trivial manipulations are allowed and the overall word-order must be
unchanged.
1.5 Combinators
We provide a brief introduction to combinators and the λ-calculus [23,26,11].
The combinators and the λ-calculus can be either typed or untyped [1]; we only
consider the typed variant here as it is used to extend classical first order logic
to higher order logic [27].
By fa we mean the application of a function f to an argument a. It is
possible to consider multiple arguments, but we prefer to regard fab as (fa)b
and so on (also known as currying, named after Curry though it was invented
by Scho¨nfinkel [23,26,11]).
A combinator, say x or y, can manipulate the arguments:
xfg ❀ gf yabc❀ cbb
The manipulations are swap (f and g), deletion (a), duplication (b), and per-
mutation (c). We can define the combinators using the so-called λ-abstraction:
x ≡ λab(ba) y ≡ λabc(cbb)
Hence for example (the numbers are treated as constants):
x1(x2y(x34)5)❀ x2y(x34)51❀ y2(x34)51❀ 5(x34)(x34)1❀ 5(43)(43)1
The λ-abstraction binds the variables (they were free before). We call a combi-
nator pure if it is defined without constants. We always use uppercase letters for
constants and lowercase letters for variables. The combinators x and y are pure.
The following combinator send is not pure (R is a constant):
send ≡ λabc(Rcba)
The combinator send means ‘sends . . . to’ and R means ‘receives . . . from’ (also
possible to use the combinator receive and the constant S). For example as in
‘Alice sends the box to Charlie’ or ‘Charlie receives the box from Alice’.
We use the λ-calculus with the following rules (observe that we write fa
rather than f(a) for the application of a function f to an argument a):
– α-conversion (y not free in α and y free for x in α):
λxα❀ λyα[x := y]
– β-reduction (β must be free for x in α):
(λxα)β ❀ α[x := β]
5– η-reduction (x not free in α):
λx(αx)❀ α
We use ❀λ for evaluation using these three rules (λ-conversion).
We use the (typed) λ-calculus [27] in formulas (and combinator definitions).
The higher order logic in Montague grammar is also based on the λ-calculus, but
the usual rules of λ-conversion do not hold unrestricted, due to the intensionality
present [18].
Our use of combinators is inspired by work in natural logic [20,21,22,29] and
differs from previous uses in computer science, mathematical logic and natural
language semantics [4,5,6,24,25].
1.6 Type Language and Type Interpretation
The basic ideas is closely related to the type theory by Morrill [17]. We take a
type theory to consist of a type language and a type interpretation.
A type language T is given by a set of basic types T0 ⊆ T and a set of rules of
type construction. There is a rule of type construction for each type constructor.
Each type constructor makes a type out of subtypes.
A type interpretation consists of an interpretation function [[·]] with respect
to a universe. A universe is a set of objects. A subset of the universe is called
a category (for example the empty category and the universal category). The
interpretation function maps types to categories. We may call a type a category
name (or even just a category, and the interpretation of the type for the category
content).
A universe together with a type interpretation for basic types [[A]] (A ∈ T0) is
a model. The type interpretation for arbitrary types is defined compositionally —
that is, the type interpretation is a composition of the subtypes interpretations
(we have to stay within the universe, of course). Hence we extend a basic type
interpretation [[A]] (A ∈ T0) to a type interpretation [[A]] (A ∈ T ). It is essential
that we do not think of objects as atomic. They can have components; hence we
get a multi-dimensional type theory. Let n be the number of dimensions.
Each type is interpreted as a category — the members hereof are called
inhabitants. An inhabitation is a category for each type. An inhabitation extends
another inhabitation if and only if (iff) for each type, the category of the former
includes the category of the latter.
With respect to the type interpretation an initial inhabitation determines a
final inhabitation as its minimal extension satisfying the interpretation of types
(we assume that such a minimal extension exists). Note that the interpretation of
types is a precise definition of the inhabitants of a type based on the inhabitant
of its subtypes.
1.7 Theory of Inhabitation and Theory of Formation
We emphasize that an inhabitation is not (just) a basic type interpretation (this
holds for initial inhabitations too).
6An arrow is a component-wise operation on objects labelled by types. An
inhabitation satisfies an arrow iff it is closed under the arrow. A theory of in-
habitation is a set of arrows. An inhabitation satisfies a theory of inhabitation
iff it satisfies every arrow in the theory of inhabitations. An initial inhabitation
together with a theory of inhabitation determine a final inhabitation which is
the minimal extension of the initial inhabitation satisfying the theory of inhab-
itation.
In order to represent objects and arrow (and inhabitations and theories of
inhabitations) we introduce representation languages (let ai range over terms of
the representation language for dimension i). An entry is a sequence of terms
and a type, written as a1 − . . .− an : A (where n is the number of dimensions).
A formation is a set of entries. A sequent or a statement of formation is a
configuration and an entry, written as ∆ ≻ a1 − . . . − an : A (where the
left side contains the antecedents and the right side contains the succedent). A
configuration is a finite set of sequences of variable declarations {x11 − . . .− xn1 :
A1, . . . , x
1
m − . . . − xnm : Am}. A statement of formation gives a formation as
all instantiations of variables. A theory of formation is a set of statements of
formation. An initial formation plus a theory of formation give a final formation
in the same way as an initial inhabitation plus a theory of inhabitation give a
final inhabitation.
We provide a theory of formation by a set of rules of formation, which defines
the theory of formation inductively.
1.8 Nabla
The main task of Nabla is then to define a total set of strings and for each string
a set of formulas. If the set of formulas for a string is empty it indicates that the
string does not map to an argument. If the set of formulas for a string has more
than one member then it shows that the string maps to an ambiguous argument
(one or more of the sentences are ambiguous).
In Nabla the grammar is completely given by a lexicon (there are no rules
specific for the particular fragment of natural language). The lexicon has a set of
entries for each token; the set of tokens is called the vocabulary. The grammar
determines the string / formula association and the logic determines the validity
of the formula. Besides the grammar and the logic we also need a tokenizer which
is a quite simple device that turns arguments into strings.
1.9 Overview
In sections 2, 3, and 4 we present the rules, the categories, and the combinators,
respectively.
Section 5 provides examples and section 6 concludes.
72 The Rules
We define a multi-dimensional type theory with the two dimensions: syntax and
semantics. We use a kind of the so-called Lambek calculus with the two type
constructors / and \, which are right- and left-looking functors [13,15,17].
We assume a set of basic types T0, where • ∈ T0 is interpreted as truth values.
The set of types T is the smallest set of expressions containing T0 such that if
A,B ∈ T then A/B,B\A ∈ T .
A structure consists of a vocabulary and a set of bases S ≡ 〈V ,B〉, where V
is finite and B(A) 6= ∅ for all A ∈ T0.
We define three auxiliary functions on types (the first for the syntactic di-
mension and the second for the semantic dimension; symbol
.
= is used for such
“mathematical” definitions, in contrast with ≡ for literal definitions):
⌈A⌉ .= V+, A ∈ T
⌊A⌋ .= B(A), A ∈ T0
⌊A/B⌋ .= ⌊B\A⌋ .= ⌊B⌋ → ⌊A⌋
|A| .= ⌈A⌉ × ⌊A⌋
By V+ we mean the set of (non-empty) sequences of elements from V (such se-




|A| (which depends only on the structure S).
With respect to S we extend a basic type interpretation [[A]] ⊆ |A| (A ∈ T0)
to a type interpretation [[A]] ⊆ |A| (A ∈ T ) as follows (the concatenation of the
strings x and x′ is written xˆx′):
[[A/B]]
.
= { 〈x, y〉 | for all x′, y′, if 〈x′, y′〉 ∈ [[B]] then 〈xˆx′, yy′〉 ∈ [[A]] }
[[B\A]]
.
= { 〈x, y〉 | for all x′, y′, if 〈x′, y′〉 ∈ [[B]] then 〈x′ˆx, yy′〉 ∈ [[A]] }
We use a so-called sequent calculus [19] with an explicit semantic dimension
and an implicit syntactic dimension. The implicit syntactic dimension means that
the antecedents form a sequence rather than a set and that the syntactic compo-
nent for the succedent is the concatenation of the strings for the antecedents. It
should be observed that all rules work unrestricted on the semantic component
from the premises to the conclusion. We refer to the resulting sequent calculus
as the Nabla calculus.
We use Γ (and ∆) for sequences of categories A1 . . . An (n > 0). The rules
have sequents of the form Γ ≻ A. The sequent means that if a1, . . . , an are
strings of categories A1, . . . , An, respectively, then the string that consists of
the concatenation of the strings a1, . . . , an is a string of category A. Hence the
sequent A ≻ A is valid for any category A.
Rules are displayed starting with the conclusion and the premises indented
below. There are two rules for / (a left and a right rule) and two rules for \ too.
The left rules specify how to introduce a / or a \ at the left side of the sequent
symbol ≻, and vice versa for the right rules (observe that the introduction is in
8the conclusion and not in the premises). The reason why we display the rules in
this way is that sequents tend to get very long, often as long as a whole line, and
hence the more usual tree format would be problematic. Also the conclusion is
usually longer than each of the premises.
We note that only the right rule of λ (where α ❀λ α
′ is λ-conversion) is
possible, since only variables are allowed on the left side of the sequent symbol.
x : A ≻ x : A =
∆ ≻ α′ : A α❀λ α′ λ
∆ ≻ α : A
∆[Γ ] ≻ β[x 7→ α] : B Cut
Γ ≻ α : A
∆[x : A] ≻ β : B
∆[Γ z : B\A] ≻ γ[x 7→ (z β)] : C \L
Γ ≻ β : B
∆[x : A] ≻ γ : C
Γ ≻ λyα : B\A \R
y : B Γ ≻ α : A
∆[z : A/B Γ ] ≻ γ[x 7→ (z β)] : C /L
Γ ≻ β : B
∆[x : A] ≻ γ : C
Γ ≻ λyα : A/B /R
Γ y : B ≻ α : A
2.1 Comments
The order of the premises does not matter, but we adopt the convention that
the minor premises (the premises that “trigger” the introduction of / or \) come
first and the major premises (the premises that “circumscribes” the introduction
of / or \) come second.
The rule /R is to be understood as follows: if we prove that (the syntactic
components for the types in) Γ with (the syntactic component for the type) B to
the right yield (the syntactic component for the type) A, then we conclude that
(. . . ) Γ (alone) yields (. . . ) A/B; furthermore if the variable y represents (the
semantic component for the type) B and the term α represents (the semantic
component for the type) A, then the λ-abstraction λyα represents (. . . ) A/B
(we do not care about the semantic components for the types in Γ since these
are being taken care of in α).
9In the same manner the rule /L is to be understood as follows: if we prove that
Γ yields B and also prove that ∆ with A inserted yields C, then we conclude that
∆ with A/B and Γ (in that order) inserted (at the same spot as in the premise)
yields C; furthermore if the term β represents B and the term γ represents
C (under the assumption that the variable x represents A), then γ with the
application (z β) substituted for all free occurrences of the variable x represents
C (under the assumption that the variable z represents A/B).
3 The Categories
As basic categories for the lexicon we have N , G, S and the top category •
corresponding to the whole argument (do not confuse the basic category N with
the constant N for ‘Nick’ and so on). Roughly we have that N corresponds to
“names” (proper nouns), G corresponds to “groups” (common nouns) and S to
“sentences” (discourses). Consider the following lexical category assignments:
John Nick Gloria Victoria : N
run dance smile : N\S
find love : (N\S)/N
man woman thief unicorn : G
popular quick : G/G
be : (N\S)/N
be : (N\S)/(G/G)
a every : (S/(N\S))/G ((S/N)\S)/G
not : (N\S)/(N\S)
nix : S/S
and or : S\(S/S)





The order of the tokens is the same as for the lexical combinators to come.
Together the lexical category assignments and the lexical combinator defini-
tions constitute a set of lexical entries. A lexicon consists of a skeleton and set
of lexical entries. For the lexicon the skeleton is just the three basic categories
N , G and S (we omit the top category, which is always •).
Note that it is not a mistake that there is no ′ for, say, the token be (compared




We introduce the following so-called logical combinators [26]:
Q˙ ≡ λxy(x = y) Equality
N˙ ≡ λa(¬a) Negation
C˙ ≡ λab(a ∧ b) Conjunction
D˙ ≡ λab(a ∨ b) Disjunction
O˙ ≡ λtu∃x(tx ∧ ux) Overlap
I˙ ≡ λtu∀x(tx⇒ ux) Inclusion
T˙ ≡ ⊤ Triviality
P˙ ≡ λab(a⇒ b) Preservation
After having introduced the logical combinators we introduce the so-called lexical
combinators. There is one or more combinator for each token in the vocabulary,
for example the combinator John for the token John, be and be′ for be and so
on (tokens and combinators are always spelled exactly the same way except for
the ′ (possibly repeated) at the end).
In order to display the lexicon more compactly we introduce two place-holders
(or “holes”) for combinators and constants, respectively. © is place-holder for
logical combinators (if any) and ◦ is place-holder for (ordinary and predicate)
constant (if any); the combinators and constants to be inserted are shown after
the | as in the following lexicon:
John Nick Gloria Victoria ≡ ◦ | J N G V
run dance smile ≡ λx(◦x) | R D S
find love ≡ λyx(◦xy) | F L
man woman thief unicorn ≡ λx(◦x) | M W T U
popular quick ≡ λtx(©(◦x)(tx)) | C˙ | P Q
be ≡ λyx(©xy) | Q˙
be′ ≡ λfx(fλy(©xy)x) | Q˙
a every ≡ λtu(©tu) | O˙ I˙
not ≡ λtx(©(tx)) | N
nix ≡ λa(©a) | N
and or ≡ λab(©ab) | C D
and′ or′ ≡ λtux(©(tx)(ux)) | C D
ok ≡ © | T˙
also ≡ λab(©ab) | C˙
so ≡ λab(©ab) | P˙
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4.1 Comments
It might be possible to display the lexicon in an even more compact way by
avoiding the remaining repetitions (for the token be), but we have not found it
worthwhile.
We have put dots above the logical combinators in order to distinguish them
from the more advanced logical combinators previously used [30] (the first four
are the same; we will not go into details about the remaining *-marked combi-
nator which also uses the special predicates E for existence and I for integrity
in a paraconsistent logic):
Q ≡ λxy(x = y) Equality
N ≡ λa(¬a) Negation
C ≡ λab(a ∧ b) Conjunction
D ≡ λab(a ∨ b) Disjunction
E ≡ λit∃x(Eix ∧ tx) Existentiality∗
U ≡ λit∀x(Eix⇒ tx) Universality∗
O ≡ λitu∃x(Eix ∧ (tx ∧ ux)) Overlap∗
I ≡ λitu∀x(Eix⇒ (tx⇒ ux)) Inclusion∗
T ≡ λi(Ii) Triviality∗
F ≡ λip(Ii ∧ pi) Filtration∗
P ≡ λpq∀i(pi⇒ qi) Preservation∗
Note that even though we use the λ-calculus of higher order logic we have not
used any higher-order quantifications.
The overlap combinator takes two sets and test for overlap (analogously
for the inclusion combinator). The triviality combinator is used in case of no
premises or no conclusions in an argument. The preservation combinator is used
between the premises and the conclusions in an argument.
Some of the combinators are discussed elsewhere, cf. [11, page 270], in partic-
ular the ‘restricted generality’ combinator Ξ corresponding to our logical combi-
nator I˙ (see also [5]), but usually using the untyped λ-calculus with a definition
of so-called canonical terms in order to avoid a paradox discovered by Curry.
Let us return to the formula we considered in the introduction:
MJ ∧WV ∧ LJV ⇒ ∃y(Wy ∧ LJy) ∧ ∃x(Mx ∧ LxV )
Using the logical combinators we obtain the formula:
P˙
(C˙ (MJ) (C˙ (WV ) (LJV )))
(C˙ (O˙ λy(Wy) λy(LJy)) (O˙ λx(Mx) λx(LxV )))
Due to the η-rule in the λ-calculus there is no difference betweenW and λy(Wy),
betweenM and λx(Mx), or between LJ and λy(LJy), but there is no immediate
alternative for λx(LxV ). We do not have to list the types of constants since either
12
the type of a constant is ǫ or the type can be determined by the types of its
arguments.
At a first glance it may appear as though the use of combinators just makes
the formula look more complicated, but we have really added much more struc-
ture to the formula. Also, we are so used to the usual formulas of predicate logic
that any change is problematic. As soon as we leave the lexicon and turn to
string / formula associations, the use of logical combinators is easier to accept.
Let us add even more structure to the formula by using the equality combi-
nator (it is triggered by the word ‘is’ in the two first sentences):
P˙
(C˙ (O˙ λx(Mx) λx(Q˙xJ)) (C˙ (O˙ λx(Wx) λx(Q˙xV )) (LJV )))
(C˙ (O˙ λy(Wy) λy(LJy)) (O˙ λx(Mx) λx(LxV )))
Finally we would like to emphasize that it is not in any way a goal to get
rid of all variables although this is surely possible by introducing a series of
pure combinators, since the pure combinators in general do not add any useful
structure to the formula. We think that the challenge is to find the best balance
between the use of combinators and the use of λ-abstractions.
Let us return to the previous formula with the logical combinators:
P˙
(C˙ (O˙ λx(Mx) λx(Q˙xJ)) (C˙ (O˙ λx(Wx) λx(Q˙xV )) (LJV )))
(C˙ (O˙ λy(Wy) λy(LJy)) (O˙ λx(Mx) λx(LxV )))
Using the lexical combinators we obtain the formula:
so
(also (a man λx(be x John))
(also (a woman λx(be x Victoria)) (love Victoria John)))
(also (a woman λx(love x John)) (a man (love Victoria)))
We find this formula remarkably elegant. What remains is the association with
the original string:
John be a man also Victoria be a woman also John love Victoria so
John love a woman also a man love Victoria
This is taken care of by the Nabla calculus. We now turn to some examples.
5 Examples: Syntax and Semantics
Consider the tiny argument (where
√
indicates that the argument is correct):
John is a popular man. √
John is popular.
The lexical category assignments to tokens give us the following string / formula
association using the sequent calculus:
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John be a popular man so John be popular
❀ so (a (popular man) λx(be x John)) (be′ popular John)
❀ P˙ (O˙ λx(C˙ (Px) (Mx)) λx(Q˙Jx)) (C˙ (PJ) (Q˙JJ))
❀ PJ ∧MJ ⇒ PJ
It is really an impressive undertaking, since not only does the order of the combi-
nators not match the order of the tokens, but there is also no immediate clue in
the string on how to get the structure of the formula right (“the parentheses”).
As expected the resulting formula is valid.
5.1 Step-by-Step Formula Extraction
We consider the following tiny argument with one premise and no conclusion
(rather special, but good enough as an example):
John smiles. √
We show that the derivations for this argument yield a formula reducible to ⊤
(and hence that the argument is a correct argument as every argument with no
conclusions is). The argument corresponds to the following string:
John smile so ok
The token so corresponds to the line in the argument and the token ok cor-
responds to the omitted conclusions. The string corresponds to the following
sequent:
N N\S S\(•/S) S ≻ •
Note that • is the top category (arguments). The other categories are given by
the lexical category assignments. By using the rules of the Nabla calculus we
obtain the following derivation:
N N\S S\(•/S) S ≻ • \L
N N\S ≻ S \L
N ≻ N =
S ≻ S =
•/S S ≻ • /L
S ≻ S =
• ≻ • =
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Step 1 For simplicity we use numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . as variables. We start from
the last line in the derivation, introduce the variables 1 and 2, and use the rule
/L to get the term 3 2 (the variable 3 is a fresh variable at the position where
the / is introduced):
3 2 ≻ 3 2 /L
2 ≻ 2 =
1 ≻ 1 =
Step 2 We reuse the variable 1 and introduce the variable 4, and use the rule
\L to get the term 4 5 (the variable 5 is a fresh variable at the position where
the \ is introduced). At last we use the rule \L to get the term 1 (5 4) 2 (the
variable 2 can be reused):
4 5 1 2 ≻ 1 (5 4) 2 \L
4 5 ≻ 5 4 \L
4 ≻ 4 =
1 ≻ 1 =
3 2 ≻ 3 2 /L
2 ≻ 2 =
1 ≻ 1 =
Step 3 The tokens of the string correspond to the variables 4, 5, 1 and 2,
respectively, and the lexical combinators are inserted yielding the extracted for-
mula. Using the logical combinators the formula is then finally reduced to ⊤ as
promised:
John smile ok so
❀ so (smile John) ok
❀ λab(P˙ a b) (λx(Sx) J) T˙
❀ P˙ (SJ) T˙
❀ λab(a⇒ b) (SJ) ⊤
❀ SJ ⇒ ⊤
❀ ⊤
This completes the step-by-step example.
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5.2 Further Examples
We first consider the argument using the string from the tokenizer:
John runs. John is Nick. √
Nick runs.
John run also John be Nick so Nick run
Here John has category N , run has category N\S, also has category S\(S/S)
and so on. The string has the top category •, since it is an argument. By using
the rules of the Nabla calculus we obtain the following derivation:
N N\S S\(S/S) N (N\S)/N N S\(•/S) N N\S ≻ • \L
N N\S S\(S/S) N (N\S)/N N ≻ S \L
N N\S ≻ S \L
N ≻ N =
S ≻ S =
S/S N (N\S)/N N ≻ S /L
N (N\S)/N N ≻ S /L
N ≻ N =
N N\S ≻ S \L
N ≻ N =
S ≻ S =
S ≻ S =
•/S N N\S ≻ • /L
N N\S ≻ S \L
N ≻ N =
S ≻ S =
• ≻ • =
We extract the following formula for the derivation.
John run also John be Nick so Nick run
❀ so (also (run John) (be Nick John)) (run Nick)
❀ P˙ (C˙ (RJ) (Q˙JN)) (RN)
❀ RJ ∧ J = N ⇒ RN
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Observe the reverse order of John and Nick in the formula with the lexical
combinators. All transitive verbs and the copula (token be) have the object
before the subject in formulas with lexical combinators. In the final formula the
order is not reversed.
Only left rules were used in the derivation above. The following argument
requires a right rule due to the existential quantifier (token a) in the object
position of the copula (token be with two lexical combinators be and be′):
John is a popular man. √
John is popular.
John be a popular man so John be popular
N (N\S)/N ((S/N)\S)/G G/G G
S\(•/S) N (N\S)/(G/G) G/G ≻ • \L
N (N\S)/N ((S/N)\S)/G G/G G ≻ S /L
G ≻ G =
N (N\S)/N ((S/N)\S)/G G ≻ S /L
N (N\S)/N (S/N)\S ≻ S \L
N (N\S)/N ≻ S/N /R
N (N\S)/N N ≻ S /L
N ≻ N =
N N\S ≻ S \L
N ≻ N =
S ≻ S =
S ≻ S =
G ≻ G =
•/S N (N\S)/(G/G) G/G ≻ • /L
N (N\S)/(G/G) G/G ≻ S /L
G/G ≻ G/G =
N N\S ≻ S \L
N ≻ N =
S ≻ S =
• ≻ • =
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John be a popular man so John be popular
❀ so (a (popular man) λx(be x John)) (be′ popular John)
❀ P˙ (O˙ λx(C˙ (Px) (Mx)) λx(Q˙Jx)) (C˙ (PJ) (Q˙JJ))
❀ PJ ∧MJ ⇒ PJ
Here the use of lexical and logical combinators is more substantial.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The multi-dimensional type theory Nabla provides a concise interpretation and
a sequent calculus as the basis for implementations. Of course other calculi are
possible for the same interpretation. The plans for future work include:
– Investigations of further type constructions for a larger natural language
coverage, cf. the treatment of propositional attitudes in [30,32] which also
replaces the classical logic with a paraconsistent logic.
– Implementations using constraint solving technologies, cf. recent work on
glue semantics [7], XDG (Extensible Dependency Grammar) [9], CHRG
(Constraint Handling Rules Grammar) [3], and categorial grammars [8,12,16].
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Appendix
We also consider integrations of work concerning the ontology underlying natural
language, to be specified in the lexicon, cf. as a starting point [10].
We are interested in a description of both syntax, semantics, and pragmatics
of natural language. As a brief illustration of the kind of semantic / pragmatic
problems we have in mind we quote the famous “fallacy of accent” story:
. . . Even the literal truth can be made use of, through manipulation of its placement,
to deceive with accent. Disgusted with his first mate who was repeatedly inebriated on
duty, the captain of a ship noted in the ship’s logbook, almost every day, “The mate
was drunk today.” The angry mate took his revenge. Keeping the log himself on a day
when the captain was ill, the mate recorded, “The captain was sober today.”
I. M. Copi & C. Cohen (2002) Introduction to Logic (11th ed.) Prentice Hall, p. 167.
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